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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Container ship cargo fires, classification, analysis, and mitigation
process using Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS-CSCF)

Degree:

Master of Science

Fire safety on container ships is undoubtedly an essential aspect of safe maritime
transport, considering the increasing demand and high growth rate of the container
shipping industry. Therefore, this study analyzed fire accidents that occurred in the
cargo area on board container ships between 2010 and 2020 to identify the root
causes of incidents and mishaps in the current fire safety systems and, if any, in the
relevant legislation.
The accident investigation reports were obtained from the Global Integrated
Shipping Information System (GISIS) database; in total, 19 container ships’ cargo
fire accidents were counted in this period with published investigation reports.
The fire accident investigation reports were analyzed by utilizing the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which suits to the research subject; a
new framework was created through the research process, labelled HFACS for
Container Ship Cargo Fire (HFACS-CSCF), to systematically identify trends in fire
accidents and develop a procedure to mitigate them through recommendations. The
undeclaration of dangerous goods by shippers proved to be the most frequent unsafe
act that contributed to the occurrence of fire accidents in the cargo area of container
ships.
Additionally, the current fire safety measures were evaluated, and measures were
suggested to mitigate the risk of “fire contain and extinguish failure” in the cargo
area of container ships, focusing on the atmospheric monitoring concept inside the
container to track any humidity or temperature changes. Finally, a connection was
made between the current ISO standards concerning containers and the International
Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code to determine the types of containers that
shall be used to carry any specific containerized cargo.
KEYWORDS: Container Ship, Cargo, Fire Safety, HFACS
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. General context
The global automated service that provides easily and cheap cargo transfer is mainly
based on the container (Levinson, 2016) and the container ship, and such process is
known as containerization (Olsen, 2022), which pushed the logistics industry to
another era (Olsen, 2022). The size of container ships has witness significant
increase in the last 50 years (AGCS, 2022), associated with interconnected risks and
complication of such increased size, the old new undeclared dangerous goods issue
increases the level of fire safety challenge.

1.2. Historical Background
In the last five years more than 70 fires have been reported on board container ships
(AGCS, 2022) The container fire rate increased significantly in the first quarter of
2019. Although the rate decreased in the following year of 2020, it remains above the
rates before 2019. It will rise again in 2021 (Cefor, 2021), heightening the doubt
about the effectiveness of current safety measures in use, even though those statistics
include all ships designed to carry containers, such as RORO-containers and fully
cellular container ships This gives a clear idea of the casualty rate in container ships.
In 2021, fire and explosion casualties represented 7% of the total number of
casualties in the European region, according to the European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA), with four fatalities reported. A fire on a container ship, specifically
in its cargo area, continues to pose the greatest risk (EMSA, 2021).

In accident investigation reports recorded and kept by the European Maritime
Casualties Information Platform (EMCIP) and Global Integrated Shipping
Information System (GISIS) created by the International Maritime Organization
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(IMO), it was highlighted that events start to appear also from the review related to
chartered vessels and the knowledge of cargo inside container safety information.

1.3. Research Contribution
The research effort will always have a contribution to enhancing maritime safety in
merchant shipping; therefore, focus has been put on the accident root cause
identification process (Celik & Cebi, 2009). New versions of Human Factor Analysis
and Classification System have been created named as Human Factors and
Classification System Container Ships Cargo Fires (HFACS- CSCF) to suit the
subject of investigation and analysis. Then the results and statistics were used to
identify the gaps in the legislation framework and associated equipment and systems.
Finally, recommendation based on the analysis incorporating the current available
innovative technology with some novel idea for atmospheric control inside the
dangerous goods containers.

1.4. Global container fleet and casualty rate
Container commodities represent 16% of the 2021 global seaborne trade calculated
in million tons (Clarksons, 2022), and the 5650 container ships around the world
represent 18% of world fleet by vessel type calculated in gross tonnage (Clarksons,
2022). There is significant increase potential as the container ships represent 38% of
the order book by vessel type (Clarksons, 2022), which means that the shipping
industry weight is shifted towards container shipping, and indeed the industry is
looking forward for safer container ships.
In a review of container vessel fire casualties over the last decade, using the Nordic
Marine Insurance Statistics (NoMIS), alarming contradictions have emerged, even
though these figures include both Ro-Ro and fully-cellular container ships. It is a
clear indicator about the safety level in this sector.
The number of container fire casualties in 2019 was 31 fire accident, which dropped
to 25 accidents in 2020 before rising again to 36 in 2021 (Cefor, 2021), revealing the
importance of root causes identification behind those rates in general (Figure1).
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Figure 1 Container vessel fires- occurrence per year (Cefor, 2021)

1.5. Research Question
I.

What are the trends in human factors that contribute to the fires on container
ships and how to mitigate them?

II.

To what extent do the current fire safety measures for the cargo area of
container vessels address the safety goals stipulated in SOLAS?

1.6. Key assumptions and potential limitations
I.

This dissertation focusses on fire accidents between 2010 and 2020 reported to
Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) and the investigation
was completed, documented, and published.

II.

The dissertation analyses the fire onboard container ships in the cargo area only.
Fires in other areas on board container ships and fire on board other ship types
are excluded.

III.

Time constraints and availability of all relevant data for the research study may
limit the capacity to conduct a thorough investigation on the intended topic.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
This chapter provides a critical review of the facts that can be found in the relevant
literature pertaining to the subject of fires that occur aboard containerships in the
cargo area. It is based on scientific literature, fire casualty reports, insurers
perspective and current regulatory framework linked to container ship fire safety.

2.2. Negative impact on insurance industry
Fire casualties on container ships frequently impose a high cost on ship owners and
associated insurers (Cefor, 2021). The fire claims have shown a trend in response to
the 2019 high occurrence rate, in terms of claims above 500.000 USD (see Figure 2).
All casualty claims have dropped since the 2007-2008 peak, except the fire and
explosion claims, which have shown a more volatile frequency than other claims
(Cefor, 2021), continuing to rise since 2018; however, the claims began to decrease
from 2019 to 2020, then slowly decrease between 2020 and 2021 (Cefor, 2021)1.

Figure 2 Container claims versus all other claims, claims above 500.000 USD

1

Index 2005 = 100%
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(Cefor, 2021)

The rising trend in container fire claims specially in large container vessels is
significant compared to any other ship type (see Figure 3) (Cefor, 2021).
The International Group of P&I Clubs indicate an increase of container ship claims,
i.e., the average number from 1.4 in the period 2010-2015 to 5.2 in the period of
2016- 2021 (spglobal, 2021).
Container fires are a high priority item in the International Union of Marine
Insurance (IUMI) with a view to amend the SOLAS Convention to reduce such
casualty rates (spglobal, 2021).

Figure 3 Fire and explosions frequency by ships type-claims >500.000 USD

(Cefor, 2021)

2.3. Current regulatory framework covering fire safety on board
container ships cargo area
2.3.1. IMO Instruments Related to Fire Safety
IMO's International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is the main
instrument for standardizing maritime shipping safety matters, and chapter II-2
addresses one of the main risks to ship safety, i.e., the fire risk (IMO, 2022d).
The International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code) include all technical
specifications for firefighting equipment and systems on board the ship according to

5

SOLAS chapter II-2, while the International Code for Application of Fire Test
Procedures (FTP Code) provides the approval criteria and tests for such equipment
and systems (IMO, 2022a).
There are non-mandatory instruments that serve the scope of fire safety, such as the
Code on Alerts and Indicators, and guidelines provided by the IMO for equipment
and systems utilizations and tests (IMO, 2022a).

Chapter II-2 has been reviewed many times by the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC). There was a complete review in 1981, followed by 1990
review in response to the Scandinavian Star fire, then in 1996 the review and
introduction of FTP, and the last major review was in 2000 with entry into
force in 2002 (IMO, 2022b).
Knowing the evolution steps of chapter II-2 helps to know the status quo, and
the development potentials in the future.
2.3.2. Review for chapter II-2 in 2000 and similarity with GoalBased Standard (GBS)
The 2000 amendments were rational and structured (Huss, 2007) with the Goal
Based Standard (GBS) similarity, as the chapter starts with objectives then functional
requirements followed by rules and regulations to achieve such requirements. Every
regulation has a purpose and functional requirements to assist implementation and
open the way for novel designs or ideas (IMO, 2002).
The introduction of the International Code for Fire Safety System (FSS) through
MSC.98(73) associated with the new chapter II-2 layout, with all technical details
moved to the code instead of overcrowded old chapter II-2, the new chapter applied
for vessels constructed on or after first of July 2002 (IMO, 2002), with some
exceptions among its regulations (IMO, 2022b).

2.3.3. Review for chapter II-2 in 2014 and container safety
measures
The amendments of 2014 by Resolution MSC.365(93) was created with the purpose
to enhance the container ship fire safety, providing means for contain the fire and
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supress it (IMO, 2014c). The application for new ship build on or after first of
January 2016 left all old ships, 5249 container vessels (Clarksons, 2016) without
such

enhancements, even though those are the minimum requirements.

The amendments include one water mist lance; in addition, the container vessel
designed to carry five tiers or more on weather deck needs to carry two “mobile
water monitors” if the ship breadth less than 30 meters and four “mobile water
monitors” if the ship breadth is more than 30 meters (IMO, 2014c). The amendments
include some technical specification for the “water mist lance” and “mobile water
monitors”(IMO, 2014c).
Six years from mandating such requirements and in response to recent disastrous
fires such as the Xpress Pearl, SOLAS provisions were deemed obsolete
(Rubesinghe et al., 2022), with the urgent need to be amended coping with increased
sizes of recent container ships. Fighting fires aboard container ships is a very risky
crew task with the present equipment required by current SOLAS standards (AGCS,
2022).
The regulatory factors affecting the container ships fire safety are part of the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework used to analyse the
19 fire investigation reports of container ships cargo area.
The primary source of data used to build the HFACS framework are the casualty
investigation reports, a critical review for the status of the casualty reporting and
requirements will be supportive.

2.4. Fire Casualty investigation reporting and impact on the container
ships safety
2.4.1. Current Regulatory framework for accident investigation
and reporting.
The member states obligation to maritime casualties reporting was mandated through
the SOLAS Convention regulation I/21 and XI-1/6, in addition to the MARPOL
Convention article eight for harmful substances reporting and article twelve for
casualties causing negative impact on the marine environment (International
7

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973). The International
Load Line Convention covers such obligation in article 23 (International Convention
on Load Lines, 1966) to create a robust framework to investigate and report
casualties and duties of flag states fulfilling such obligations. All this IMO
instruments can be seen as a derivative from the United Nations Convention on the
Law Of The Sea (UNCLOS 82), article 94, which details the flag state duties and
mandates the investigation and reporting responsibility through paragraph seven of
the article (UNCLOS, 1982).

2.4.2. Development of IMO reporting system, Global Integrated
Shipping Information System (GISIS) and positive impact on
the safety of ships
When chapter XI-1 was amended in 2008 through MSC.257(28) and regulation six
introduced under the name “additional requirements for the investigation of marine
casualties and incidents”(IMO, 2008c), the scope was to assist the Member States to
fulfil their casualty reporting and investigation responsibilities, taking into
consideration national law applicability (IMO, 2014a), which will be vital to enhance
and develop the safety on board ships globally through study and analysis lessons
identified from such casualties (IMO, 2014a). The technical details for conducting
effective investigation report mandated through MSC.255(84) were labelled Casualty
Investigation Code (IMO, 2008b), with the pre-established Global Integrated
Shipping Information System GISIS in 2005 (IMO, 2010a). As an international
informative and reporting platform, the global reporting system elements seem to be
available; however, the absent part was the commitment of the member states
themselves to conduct such investigations and reporting. The IMO urges the member
states through resolution A.1074(28) to utilize such system to fulfil its obligation
(IMO, 2014b). The IMO also through resolution A.1075(28) provides guidelines to
assist the causality investigation process and help the implementation of the Casualty
Investigation Code (IMO, 2014a). (See Figure 4)
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2.4.3. Missing fire casualty reports Summary with responsible flag
state and negative impact on fire safety
Despite the IMO efforts to establish the GISIS as a direct reporting system (IMO,
2010a) and create a legal framework trough many instruments such as SOLAS 74,
MARPOL 73/78, and Load Lines 66/88 in addition to the code and guidelines, many
contracting governments did not fulfil their obligations. Casualty investigations,
reporting to the IMO and circulating to other contracting governments were not
done. Such findings were addressed in the “IMO Member State Audit Scheme
(IMSAS) – Fifth Consolidated Audit Summary Report (CASR)” with the Root
Causes and action to be taken to mitigate (IMO, 2021a).
The Casualty Investigation Code consists of three parts. Part one and two are
mandatory requirements (IMO, 2008b), while part three is guidelines for the
investigation process to be considered. Further, paragraph 14.4, part II mandates that
the “marine safety investigation report” need to be released to “public and shipping
industry” by the investigating authority (IMO, 2008b).

The IMO Instruments

Implementation (III) code, paragraph 40 and 41, detail part of flag state investigation
requirements, which make the investigation report public and forwarded to the IMO.
Reviewing the fifth IMSAS CASR revealed that the findings in paragraphs 108 and
120 are related to this matter, where member states failed to release the casualties
reports to the public and failed to provide a mechanism for such release (IMO,
2021a). The deadline for corrective action set by the report was November 2022 for
findings in paragraph 108 and December 2022 for findings in paragraph 120 (IMO,
2021a).

9

Figure 4 Casualty investigation and reporting diagram
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In reviewing the fire casualty reports for container ships through the GISIS platform,
many casualty reports were missing, while some were submitted to the platform but
not available for public download (IMO, 2022e). The IMO cannot publish such
reports if they have not been made public by the investigation authority itself. Such
review with results reveals a gap in the research effort. Twenty-five missing fire
casualty investigation reports in container ships’ cargo area were counted, in the tenyear period from 2010 to 2020, eight casualties have an incident summary in GISIS
without reports (IMO, 2022e), while seventeen container ship fire casualty reports
were not published, neither on GISIS nor any national flag state or investigation
board web site or source. (See Table 1, figure 5)

Table 1 Summary of missing container ships cargo fire casualty reports

1

Ships Name

APL LE HAVRE

09/08/2019

3

KMTC
HONG
KONG
ZIM QINGADO

4

ER KOBE

13/02/2019

5

APL
VANCOUVER

31/01/2019

6

SSL KALKOTA

13/07/2018

2

7
8
9

MAERSK
KENSINGTON
MAERSK
KARACHI

25/05/2019
21/03/2019

16/03/2018
22/05/2017

MSC DANIELA

04/04/2017

10

WAN HAI 307

19/09/2016

11

PHILIPA
SHULTE

22/08/2016

Severity
Of the
Casualties
(officially)

Not
declared
Not
declared
Serious
Not
declared
Not
declared
Not
declared
Not
declared
Not
declared
Less
serious
Not
declared
Serious
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Reports
Forward
to IMO

Singapore

NO

NA

NO

Korea

NO

NA

NO

Israel

NO

NA

YES

Liberia

NO

NA

NO

Singapore

NO

NA

NO

India

NO

NA

NO

USA

NO

NA

NO

Hong Kong

NO

NA

NO

Panama

YES

NA

YES

Singapore

NO

NA

NO

Liberia

NO

NA

YES

Responsible
Flag State

Incident summary
available at GISIS

S/N

Date Of
Occurrence

Reports
available
or not
available
for
public
and
shipping
industry
download

12

NORTHERN
VOLITION

24/11/2015

13

CAP MORETON

12/09/2015

14

MARENO

30/08/2015

15

UASC ALULA

28/08/2015

16

MAERSK SEOUL

19/07/2015

17

S KAMALA

10/07/2015

18

MAERSK
LONDRINA

25/04/2015

19

COSCO PRIDE

13/07/2014

CMA
CGM
LILIAC
MAERSK
KAMPALA
AMSTERDAM
BRIDGE
MAERSK
KINLOSS

20
21
22
23

28/09/2013
29/08/2013
09/09/2012
17/07/2012

24

CAP EGMONT

05/05/2012

25

ALERT
RICKMERS

04/04/2011



Not
declared
Not
declared
Not
declared
Not
declared
Serious
Less
serious
Not
declared
Not
declared
Not
declared
Not
declared
Serious
Not
declared
Less
serious
Less
serious

Portugal

NO

NA

NO

NO

NA

NO

NO

NA

NO

Malta

NO

NA

NO

Liberia

NO

NA

YES

Liberia

NO

NA

YES

Hong Kong

NO

NA

NO

Hong Kong
SAR
of
China

NO

NA

NO

Hong Kong

NO

NA

NO

NO

NA

NO

YES

NA

YES

UK

NO

NA

NO

Liberia

NO

NA

YES

Liberia

NO

NA

YES

Marshall
Islands
Antigua and
Barbuda

Marshall
Islands
Antigua and
Barbuda

Fire on board MV Santa Rose in 2014 was not counted, no data found.

The missing container fire accident reports are creating an iceberg effect on the fire
safety system of the container shipping industry, where a lot of data and root causes
are buried with the accidents without any feedback to the industry to enhance the fire
safety level; 57% of the container fire accidents are without published investigation
reports. (See Figure 6)
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Flag states which did not fulfill the obligation of
Casuality Investigation Code paragraph 14.4
(container fire casualties)
7

Liberia

6
5

Hong Kong

4
Singapore
Marshall Island &
Antiago and
Barbado

3
2

Malta/Korea/Israe
l/Portugal/Panam
a/USA/UK/India

1
0
Flag states which did not fill the obligation of casuality investigation code paragraph 14.4
Figure 5 Flag states did not fulfill obligation of casualty investigation code paragraph 14.4

Fire Casulties Investigation Reports
Fire casualties
with published
investigation

19,
43%

report,

Fire casualties
without
published
investigation

25,
57%

report,

Figure 6 Fire casualties investigation reports
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2.5. Dynamic container ships sizes and capacity with static fire safety
regulation frame and requirements.
Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) is used to measure the container ship capacity.
Such capacity has been doubled in the last decade and witnessed a 1500 % increase
rate compared with the 1968 figures (AGCS, 2022). While the fire safety provisions
in SOLAS have seen a few changes that do not correspond to such an increase (Hulin
et al., 2020), some insurers see that current SOLAS objectives cannot be achieved
using current SOLAS provisions related to container ship safety (gard, 2020), many
flag states have proposed papers to the IMO serving the scope of amending the
current SOLAS,II-2 provisions to cope with the industry expansion (See Figure 7)
(gard, 2020).

(AGCS, 2022)
Figure 7 Increased container TEU in last 54 years
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2.6. Fire divisions in cargo hold area with the current SOLAS
provisions
The purpose of regulation nine of SOLAS chapter II-2 is fire containment at origin
space (IMO, 2022c). This purpose is derived from the “fire safety objectives”
detailed in regulation two and following functional requirements in the same
regulation, the use of fire divisions is provided to achieve the containment task. The
criteria for fire divisions A, B and C detailed in regulation three are labelled as
definitions (IMO, 2022c). The approval criteria are available in the FTP Code
including testing of prototype by the flag state or Recognized Organization (RO)
authorized by the flag state. Eight tables are provided in regulation nine to achieve
such principle for different ship types; Table 9.1 to Table 9.4 are specified for
passenger vessels, while Tables 9.5 and 9.6 for all cargo ships except tankers, which
have two separated table s9.7 and 9.8 (IMO, 2022c).
Reviewing Table 9.5 for “Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces”
reveals absence of any requirement regarding fire division between different cargo
holds, except a note that such bulkhead needs to be “steel or any equivalent material”
and it is not required to be “A” class standard (IMO, 2022c). This leads to an
important question: What is the requirement set in SOLAS, chapter II-2 to provide
the contain principle of the fire in container ship cargo hold if it is not achieved by
fire divisions.
Considering Table 9.6 for “Fire integrity of decks separating adjacent spaces” of
cargo ships, which is applied to container ships as a cargo ship, the separated deck
between cargo holds and deck cargo does not have any fire division classification.
The same note applied for the steel material; in other words, there is no division to
help contain fire on deck and prevent spread to the cargo hold area or vice versa in
vertical direction (IMO, 2022c).

15

Figure 8 Fire integrity of bulkheads separated adjacent spaces in cargo ships SOLAS, II-2/9, table 9.5

Figure 9 Fire integrity of decks separating adjacent spaces in cargo ships - SOLAS, II-2/9, Table 9.6
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2.7. Review of research effort connected to fire and explosion in
maritime shipping related to container fires
In 2007 and as part of IMO rule making process, a proposal paper submitted by the
State of Denmark, representing the results of SAFEDOR project funded by the EU
including container vessel Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) study (IMO, 2007),
which demonstrated that the container ship operation Risk Profile sit within the
ALARP2 zone, and that fire risk represent 17% of the total risk onboard those ships.
The aim of the FSA was to examine the risk level on board container ships for the
sake of the whole industry, and the study identify early the undeclared dangerous
goods as a root cause for many incident (IMO, 2007).
In addition, the study set the fire accident as the main contributor to the risk on
human life according to Lloyds Maritime Information Unit (LMIU) data base
statistics used in the assessment. The assessment methodology included a Hazard
Identification (HAZID) step followed by risk analysis and then considering the
available Risk Control Option RCO (IMO, 2018).

The Risk Control Option RCO identified for container ship fire risk provided by the
study was “undeclared dangerous goods amount reduction” without providing any
technical provisions or idea about how to start or achieve this (IMO, 2007).
The following step of the FSA was cost benefit assessment, which applied criteria for
cost effectiveness and found that the proposed RCO for fire risk costly ineffective.
Hence, no recommendation for mandatory requirements was adopted, and no
mitigation procedure was considered (IMO, 2007).
The study was generic and focused more on the grounding and collision impact
rather than the fire casualties (IMO, 2007).
The undeclared dangerous goods risk on container shipping was analyzed by Ellis
(2011), with US3 and UK extracted database records, for 1998-2008 period. The

2

ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practical (acceptable risk level)

3

Hazardous Materials Information Resource System (HMIRS) platform / USA
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release of such material attributed to many factors in the preloading stage such as
packing and stuffing (Ellis, 2011).
Globally 15% of fatalities identified in the same period were linked to release of
containerized dangerous goods and self-ignition (Ellis, 2011).

Ship fires in general were the focus of many researchers in the past decade.
Kwiecińska (2015) investigated ship fires using causes and effect analysis relations
diagrams, and the scope was widened to include all ship types and fishing vessels
(Kwiecińska, 2015). Fire or explosions represent 20% of casualties based on GISIS
data between the 2009-2014 period. The fire accidents were distributed by ship type,
and container ships represent 8% of all fire casualties, so the main outcome of the
paper was fire interrelationship diagram, with cause-and-effect links contributing to
fire occurrence (Kwiecińska, 2015).
Another analysis of causes of fire onboard ships was conducted by Raquel (2015).
The scope of the analysis covered different types of vessels including only one
container vessel among the 20 investigated fire and explosion accidents. The
Casualty Analysis Methodology for Maritime Operation (CASMET) methodology
was used to code the “accidental events” and 138 events was identified.
The analysis outcome revealed causal factors were related to lack of knowledge with
44%, inadequate operation 40% and firefighting factors with 30.7% (Raquel, 2015).
The results were crucial to identify Human Error as the leading cause of accidental
events, with 57.2%, the equipment failure represents 32.6% of accidental events,
including firefighting system as the most frequent one. Moreover, the inability to
identify latent technical failure was presented as one of the main causes of such
accidents (Raquel, 2015).
The study presented by Rath (2016) was dedicated to fires analysis on fully cellular
container vessels; the analysis time frame covered the period of 2000-2015. Rath
raised the debate about fire safety in relation to the increased size of container ships,
utilizing the findings of German Council of Transport Authority 54th meeting held in
January 2016 (Rath, 2016).
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The council recommended a set of requirements as an emergency response
provisions, related to equipment, training and external assistance as specialist fire
fighters and port of refuge availability (Rath, 2016).
The study was set to be part of another FSA aim to enhance the fire safety measures
regarding containing and supressing the container fires at IMO level. The fleet
volume and development as well as legislation framework were illustrated, with
focus on the equipment. Critical assessment was done, using a simulation process
with specific criteria and fires in the timeframe of the research was analyzed and a
set of charts represented the outcome data in various methods (Rath, 2016).
The study was utilized by International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) and
presented as a position paper from insurers’ perspective in 2017 (IUMI, 2019). The
Union raised the fire safety of container ships again in Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC) meeting 101, in 2019, with efforts to gain support from all stakeholders to
amend the item in the IMO agenda for 2022 (IUMI, 2019).
Baalisampang et al. (2018) reviewed fire accidents in the maritime shipping domain
between 1990 and 2015, categorizing the casualties into five main groups based on
causation criteria, “human error, mechanical failure, reaction electrical fault and
unknown”, then, provided preventive and mitigation actions for each category
(Baalisampang et al., 2018).
Human error caused 48% of claims, while mechanical failure came second with 22%
and thermal reaction with 14% from fire and explosion causes. The study detailed
human error as contributing factors (Baalisampang et al., 2018).

The safety engineering perspective in container fires causes and escalation was
exhibited through Callesen et al. (2019), with a novel method to assess fire
prevention and de-escalation alternatives (Callesen et al., 2019).
The timeframe of Callesen’s work covers the period of 1996-2017, with 39 container
ship fires recorded.

The hazard analysis scope focused on dangerous cargo,

specifically Calcium Hypochlorite, compressed charcoal briquette, rechargeable
batteries and Divinylbenzene through the process. Causes and consequences for each

19

material were examined; furthermore, the fire detection time reduction, using a
simulation modelling with computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software was
explained (Callesen et al., 2019).
In 2011 the initiative Cargo Incident Notification System (CINS) was launched by
major container ships lines. The data base resulted from cargo incident information
share used to examine specific cargo related risks with final objectives to enhance
safety level on board container ships (CINS, 2022a). There have been many carriage
guidelines issued through the platform, calcium hypochlorite and charcoal included
(CINS, 2022b).

The Danish Maritime Institute funded project named CONTAIN, with the technical
support of the Danish Institute of Fire and Security Technology (DBI), detailed all
container ship fire casualties in the period 1996-2019 with fatalities statistics
disclosing

negative impacts in the insurance industry and gap in the regulatory

framework of fire safety onboard container ships (Hulin et al., 2020). Many analyses
of fire causes were included, and Raquel’s (2015) paper statistics and findings were
enclosed (Hulin et al., 2020).
The project tried to answer questions about fire spread mechanisms among
containers, and generally, the stakeholder perspective about container ship fires
(Hulin et al., 2020). A critical review of the research shows success in this scope.
The potential of fire safety engineering was explored There was previous work of
this by Callesen et al. (2019) and the project utilized Callesen’s work in causes of
cargo fires and explosions in container ships (Hulin et al., 2020), helping to
technically enrich the content of the research and as a part of technical review.
The objectives set for CONTAIN project was knowledge enhancement about
container fires and bring stakeholders together in what can be described as workshop
for container ship fires (Hulin et al., 2020).
However, the research did not clearly set a knowledge level and how can this be
measured or effect positively in the risk mitigation of container fires.
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Recent analytical research of container ships’ cargo area fires was introduced by
Krmek et al. (2022) covering the 2010-2020 period, stated that dangerous goods
form 10-12% of globally transported containers. The paper analyzed 23 container
fires in the cargo area, but using commercial web sites4 and unacademic sources of
information and data about fire causes and sources of ignition in the unpublished
container fire casualties degrading the overall value of the paper (Krmek et al.,
2022). The outcome of the paper focused on fire causes and ensured the ineffectiveness of current fire safety measures on container ships with ta negative
impact to human lives.
Krmek et al. (2022) set their results with undeclared dangerous goods as main
contributor elements, and specific dangerous goods as Calcium Hypochlorite and
Charcoal as the most identified source of ignition connected to container ships’ cargo
area fires (Krmek et al., 2022).
Container ship accidents were also discussed by Rahim and Sunaryo (2019) in
relation to stacked containers on deck only.

The paper demonstrated some

investigation board data and statistics on casualties onboard container ships, such as
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), the Marine Accident Investigation
Branch (MAIB) of the UK, the Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation
(BSU) of Germany and the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada (Rahim &
Sunaryo, 2019). In addition, a novel Fish Bone diagram analysis of contributing
factors in container ships accidents was presented due to stacked containers on deck,
including ineffectiveness of ship firefighting systems, and undeclared dangerous
goods as human error and as management deficiencies, with consequences such as
incorrect stowage position and preloading problems like un-correct packing (Rahim
& Sunaryo, 2019).

4

www.fleetmon.com
https://gcaptain.com/
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The environmental impact resulting from large scale container fires was handled by
Rubesinghe et al. (2022). The disastrous fire on board MV Xpress Pearl at the
anchorage area in front of Colombo in Sri Lanka in 2021 has left devastating
pollutants in the coastal waters and beaches of the area and nearby areas. The study
was supported by the International Pollutant Elimination Study Network (IPEN)
from the Swedish government and the Center of Environmental Justice (CEJ), a Sri
Lankan public environment interested agency (Rubesinghe et al., 2022).
The air pollutant, toxic micro plastic and caustic soda were part of a killer pollutant
mix released to the beaches of Columbo leaving a disastrous social and economic
losses (Rubesinghe et al., 2022).
Again, Rubesinghe et al. (2022) doubted the effectiveness of current regulatory
framework, including but not limited to SOLAS, Chapter II-2, and International
Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG)Code. The research described that the
contributing factors of the fire started with spill of Nitric Acid and sequences of
events till the sinking and total loss of the vessel (Rubesinghe et al., 2022). The
pollutant types and negative impact on the marine environment were analyzed, using
a data collected by sampling the water in the accident and surrounding area.
(Rubesinghe et al., 2022). The study ended with steps forward and recommendations
including Hazardous Noxious Substances (HNS) Convention ratification and port of
refuge availability for enhancing the future emergency response and the possibility of
reoccurrence of such type of accident was also demonstrated (Rubesinghe et al.,
2022).
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology
3.1. Introduction
This chapter aims to introduce the methodology for the dissertation. There is no
human performance without error (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997); therefore,
accidents involving human error will continue to occur. This chapter will create a
framework for human error classification and analysis to suit container fires, to
identify the human factor root causes contributing to fire accidents in the cargo area
of container ships.

Many accidents that were studied in the past have not

disappeared, but new forms of accidents have emerged. In response to these
advancements, the scientific community has created new investigation procedures
and accident models (Lundberg et al., 2009).

3.2. Human error approach
Human error has two approaches, person approach and the system approach (Reason,
2000), where causation and management of error are different in each (Reason,
2000). The unsafe act is the main concept of the person approach, while the system
approach focuses more on working conditions and the idea of defenses and barriers
to prevent any adverse actions (Reason, 2000). The focus of the unsafe act within the
person approach can isolate it from the ambient system, which is considered as one
of the main defects in such an approach (Reason, 2000).

3.3. Organizational accidents and Swiss Cheese Model
When the accident causes are analyzed with system approach, the term
organizational accident or what is known as ORGAX (Reason, 2016) can be
understood. Despite the varieties between all organizational accidents, there are
united characteristics for them such as hazards, failed barriers, and losses (Reason,
2016); in other words, unidentified hazards overcome the current safety barriers and
cause losses to people, assets, and environment.
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With the system approach focusing on the idea of safety barriers, such barriers may
lose due to divergent objectives (Rasmussen, 1997). The effective risk management
here will be how to enforce such barriers.
In a perfect world, the safety barriers or defenses of any organization will be intact
(Reason, 2000), which is not the case as all barriers have spots of weakness or holes
in the defenses (Reason, 2016). These holes or failures have two-component, active
and latent failures (Reason, 1990).
Active failure is errors or violations that have a direct and immediate adverse effect
(Reason, 1990), such activities conducted by frontlines operators. In the shipping
industry context, these will be the ship’s crew (Reason, 1990), while latent failure is
unrevealed hazardous actions or designs or decisions (Reason, 1990) and will remain
hidden until combined with active failure to result as an accident (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2003),. Such latent failures may be planted unintentionally by the
designers or maintainers of the system and remain there dormant (Reason, 2016).
In 1990 James Reason defined his Swiss cheese model where he defined four levels
of accident causation; one active failure and three latent failures within any system
defenses, each consequent on the previous level, working backwards from the
accident back to unsafe act to reach the organizational influences level (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2003).

3.4. Swiss Cheese Model SCM and Human Factor Analysis and
Classification System HFACS
Due to the high rate of accidents in the United States Navy in the 90s, Dr. Douglas
Wiegmann and Dr. Scott Shappell were assigned to reveal the causal factor behind
such cases (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Based on the Swiss Cheese Model of
James Reason (1990), they developed their taxonomy for the failure modes defined
as Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).
Their HFACS describes three levels of latent failures as Reasons include
Precondition for Unsafe Act, Unsafe Supervision and Organizational Influences and
Active Failure represented through the Unsafe Act level (Shappell & Wiegmann,
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2003). Like the Reason Model, the HFACS follows the System Approach and
covers the identification of organizational area contributing to the adverse action or
accidents (Garrett & Jochen, 2009).

Organizationa

Latent Failure

l Influences

Unsafe
Supervision

Latent Failure
Precondition
for Unsafe Act

Latent Failure
Unsafe Act

Active Failure

Accident
Figure 10 Swiss Cheese Model (adapted from reason, 1990)

3.5. Human factor analysis and classification system HFACS and
adaptability
Since its creation in the 90s, the HFACS model has been modified to adapt to
multiple usage (Theophilus et al., 2017), analysing human factors in a wide range of
industries including aviation, maritime shipping, mining, construction, and health
care. Modification includes adding a fifth level in some cases, such the HFACS-MSS
for machinery space fires (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011) and HFACS-MA for
marine accidents (Chen et al., 2013) or increase the level of granularity as in
Department of Defence DOD-HFACS (O’Connor, 2008).
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Table 2 HFACS Versions

Sector
1.

3.
4.
5.

Maritime Shipping industry safety

2.

Adapted HFACS
HFACS- MA
Maritime
Accident
HFACS- FAHB
Fuzzy, Analytical
Hierarchy Process
HFACS- MSS
Machinery Space
on Ships
HFACS- PV
Passenger vessels
HFACS- FCM
Fuzzy Cognitive
Mapping

Main modifications
Modification of the precondition and add the
fifth level, integrate the SHEL model into the
framework as adopted tool by IMO (2000)
Integration with fuzzy algorithm

adapted to machinery space features
Add operational condition level
Integrate the HFACS with fuzzy theories to
quantify the accidents analysis

Author
(Chen
2013)

et

al.,

(Celik & Cebi,
2009)
(SchröderHinrichs et al.,
2011)
(Yildiz et al.,
2021)
(Soner
2015)

et

al.,

10.

HFACS ADF
Australian
Defence Force

Based on the review of 27 collision accidents,
adding fifth layer of outside factors and
modified Precondition for Unsafe Act
Based on HFACS Coll with modification to
adapt to 115 reviewed grounding accidents
Integrate the Fault Tree Model with the
HFACS, using 17 collision accidents relevant
to icebreakers operations to build the
framework, external factors for HFACS MA
were considered (Kaptan et al., 2021)
Modified level one to include Act of
Sabotage as an Unsafe Act, modification in
all levels accept unsafe supervision level
three to adapt to offshore safety scope.
Identical to extent to the original HFACS
frame with numerous contextual and semantic
differences.

11.

HFACS ME

Framework change for adaptability

(Rashid et al.,
2010)

DoD HFACS
US Department of
Defence

A fine-grain classification level was added
(O’Connor, 2008).

US Department
of
Defence
(DoD,2005)

Based on 508 mining accidents, modification
in precondition for unsafe act level.

(Patterson
&
Shappell, 2010)

Classify the Unsafe Act to Errors and
Contraventions and add the Act of Sabotage
as a third tier under Contraventions beside
Routine and Exceptional.

(Reinach
Viale, 2006)

6.
7.

HFACS Ground
Grounding
HFACS- SIBCI
Ship Icebreaker
Collision in Ice
Covered Waters

12.

Aviation/
defence

13.

Mining

HFACS- OGI
Oil
and
Gas
Industry

HFACS MI
Mining

14.

Railroad

Offshore
safety

8.

9.

HFACS- Coll
Collision

HFACS RR
Railroad

26

(Chauvin et al.,
2013)
(Mazaheri et al.,
2015)
(Zhang et
2019)

al.,

(Theophilus
al., 2017)

et

(N. S. Olsen &
Shorrock, 2010)

&

In the maritime sector, eight versions of HFACS have been identified with minor
changes for adaptability, i.e., the modification of the Precondition of Unsafe Act is
presented in all maritime versions of HFACS (Kaptan et al., 2021). The addition of
the fifth layer of factors is presented with different labels, named as outside factors in
HFACS MSS, HFACS COLL and HFACS Ground (Kaptan et al., 2021) or external
factors as HFACS MA (Chen et al., 2013).
The precondition level at HFACS MA include the SHEL model adopted by the IMO
(2000). The software in that level includes organizational policies and procedures
(IMO, 2000), which are covered in the organizational influence level, to avoid
duplication or overlapping. This HFACS layout was not considered as a base to
develop the Human Factor Analysis and Classification System for Container Ships
Cargo Fires (HFACS CSCF).
The HFACS Coll framework referred to 27 collision accidents occurring between
1998 and 2012 (Chauvin et al., 2013). The HFACS Ground as a lightly modified the
version of the HFACS COLL (Kaptan et al., 2021) was designed mainly for
grounding accidents with 115 cases used to create such framework (Kaptan et al.,
2021) Due to the specialty of the frame to the grounding accidents, it was not
considered through the creation of HFACS Container Ships Cargo Fires (CSCF).

3.6. Introduction of Human Factor Analysis and Classification SystemContainer Ships Cargo Fire (HFACS-CSCF) as a new adapted
version to suite the research subject
The granularity of HFACS was not designed to address container ship accidents;
therefore, an adapted framework will be created to suit the research subject. The
identification process for the high frequency of causal factors container ship cargo
fires can be crucial to decrease such accidents. The Human Factor Analysis and
Classification System for Container Ship Cargo Fire (HFACS CSCF) is based upon a
modified version of HFACS MSS, with modification to the fourth tier of causal
factors and redesignation the Outside factors of HFACS- MSS as Regulatory factors.
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It is worthy to note that the international standards and flag state responsibilities and
implementation are not outside factors, because in the maritime domain, nothing is
outside factors. Therefore, the fifth layer was labelled with Regulatory Factors to
ensure the system approach in dealing with the causal factors related to human
performance affecting Container Ships Cargo Fires accidents.
The details of the third tier under the Regulatory Factors level include international
standard and flag state implementation as HFACS MSS (Schröder-Hinrichs et al.,
2011), in addition to port state implementation including the container control,
inspection and content identification responsibilities.
The HFACS CSCF consists of five levels and 13 categories in the second tier
corresponding to them, the Unsafe Act as the first level and only active failure,
triggers the incident and reveal the remaining four latent failures in the system. (See
Table 5)
Weather condition under ship operations is classified under precondition for unsafe
act in the first tier and environmental factors in the second tier, with description of
physical environment at the third tier of this category. Factors such air temperature
either tropical or cold and sea state with associated winds are considered as
contributing factors in many cases as noticed from the container fire reports, when
weather conditions affect individuals and contribute to fire in containers (DoD,
2005). This is classified as physical environmental factors.
The design or operational failure in fixed firefighting system or critical firefighting
equipment are classified under precondition for unsafe act as the first tier,
environmental factors as second tier and technological factors as third tire. The
criteria here is the equipment design that affects individuals and their actions in
workplace and lead to “unsafe situation” (DoD, 2005).
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Table 3 HFACS CSCF

1ST TIER

2ND TIER

Regulatory Factors
(Level 5)

Statutory

Resources

Latent failure

Organizational
Influences
(Level 4)

Organizational process
Unsafe Supervision/
workplace factors
(Level 3)

Precondition for Unsafe
Acts
(Level 2)

Active failure

Organizational climate

Unsafe Acts
(Level 1)

3RD TIER
International standard
Port state implementation
Ship
Flag
state
implementation
Human resources
Technological resources
Equipment/facilities
resources
Structure
policies
cultures
Operation
procedure

oversight
Shipborne
and
supervision
inappropriate Shipborne operation

Inadequate supervision

shore

Planned
operations
Failed to correct known Shipborne related short
problems
comings
Supervisory violation
Shipborne violation
Physical environment
Environmental factors
Technological environment
Crew condition
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Personal factors
Crew interaction
Personal readiness
Skill Based Error
Decision and judgment error
Errors
Perceptual errors
Operators’ error
Ship’s
crew
Routine
violation
Violations
Ship’s crew Exceptional
violation
Operator’s violation

The human error research effort has focuse on the crew onboard the ship for decades
as the only source of errors and violations (Sánchez-Beaskoetxea et al., 2021), while
in the shipping industry system approach for human error, other individuals should
not be excluded. The gantry crane operator, shipper or charterers and third-party
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maintenance or repair gang can perform unsafe acts triggering the sequence of events
leading to misshapes or accidents. The tunnel vision of connecting human error
accidents on board the ship only to the crew on board needs to be eliminated. The
interface between the ship, port and other stake holders as charterers and shippers
need to be considered.
Arguments here can arise if the shippers’ or charterers’ unsafe acts need to be
classified as outside factors. In the system approach for the container shipping
industry nothing is outside factors, so all the parts of the industry need to be
examined as a whole system.
The unsafe act can be categorized as errors and violations (Kaptan et al., 2021).
Errors are not exclusive to the ship’s crew only; in other words, the unintentional acts
that lead to triggering an accident can also be operator based. Conducting hot work
near containers shows a lack of awareness from both the ship’s crew and repair gang
and can be classified as an error. Operator error causal categories are added to
discriminate such type of errors.
Following such an approach, violations need to be classified as ship’s crew violations
and other operators’ violations, which are included in the fourth tier. Related causal
factors are shipping of undeclared dangerous goods by shippers or charters, the
improper handling of a containers by crane operators or violations related to third
party maintenance or repair gang.
HFACS violations represent the intentional bypass of regulations and rules
governing the maritime shipping industry (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003). The
differentiation between routine and exceptional violations is often based on an
organization's response to, and individual behaviour (Kaptan et al., 2021).
The Routine Violation as intended disregard to policies and regulations tolerated by
the organization (Kaptan et al., 2021), described as habitual (Patterson & Shappell,
2010).
In analysing the unsafe act of mis declare or undeclare dangerous goods by shippers
or charterers; its neither a habitual nor intentionally tolerated by the organization, it
cannot be described as exceptional violation as its not “isolated departure from the
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authority”, which doesn’t reflect the individual behaviour nor organization tolerance
(Patterson & Shappell, 2010). to enhance the granularity of the framework we create
another causal factor in the third tier of violations named as Operator’s Violations,
defined as intended acts to disregard rules, policies, and regulations, tacitly
encouraged by lack of organization technical ability to monitor all operations
aspects, to prevent its occurrence.
Thus, the organizations' tolerance is neither a lack of awareness of the risks nor to
enable flexing the rules, but rather a lack of technical capability and tools to monitor
and identify the risks effectively.

3.7. The HFACS-CSCF coding process
Reviewing the Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS), a total of 19
container ship cargo fire reports were analysed to create the HFACS CSCF codes
revealed through each report. These were unified in tier four of causal factors in the
five levels of HFACS CSCF and reviewed by two experts to agree on the coding
process (See Figure 12). (See Appendix A)

Figure 11 Human Factor Analysis and Classification System Container Ship Cargo Fires HFACS- CSCF framework
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Chapter 4
Results and analysis
4.1. Introduction
Identifying the trends in container ship cargo fires using the Human Factor Analysis
and Classification System for Container Ships Cargo Fires (HFACS CSCF) and
create the causal factor data with classification, will contribute to increase the
awareness for container ship cargo fires and help reveal the recommendations and
mitigation process required.

4.2. Frequency and percentage of Causal Factor according to Human
Factor Analysis and Classification System – Container Ship Cargo
Fires (HFACS-CSCF)
Reviewing the 19 container ships fire accidents investigation reports in the period
2010-2020, obtained through GISIS platform using HFACS CSCF described in
chapter three, 259-causal factors in the fourth tier were identified through the process
and categorized under the five categories of HFACS CSCF with the corresponding
second and third tier causal factors.
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Table 4 Causal factor frequency and percentage using HFACS-CSCF

HFACS CSCF category
Regulatory Factors
International standard
Port state implementation
Ship Flag state implementation
Organizational Influences
Human resources
Technological resources
Equipment/facilities / resources
Procedure
Oversight
Unsafe Supervision/workplace factors
Shipborne and shore supervision
Shipborne operation
Shipborne related short comings
Shipborne violation
Precondition for Unsafe Acts
Physical environment
Technological environment
Cognitive factors
Physiological state
Crew interaction
Personal readiness
Unsafe Acts
Skill Based Error
Decision and judgment error
Perceptual errors
operators’ error
Ship’s crew Routine violation
Ship’s crew Exceptional violation
Operator’s violation
Total

N
54
17
23
14
44
1
10
23
6
4
27
20
3
4
0
84
59
16
5
1
4

%
20.9%
6.6%
8.9%
5.4%
17.1%
0.4%
3.9%
8.9%
2.3%
1.5%
10.5%
7.7%
1.2%
1.6%
32.6%
22.9%
6.2%
1.9%
0.4%
1.6%

49
9
11
4
2
2
0
21
259

19%
3.5%
4.3%
1.6%
0.8%
0.8%
8.1%
100%

The less frequent set of causal factors contributed to container ship fire accidents are
set in the Unsafe Supervision (US) category, while the high frequent contributed
causal factors were set in the Precondition for Unsafe Act (PUA) category.
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HFACS CSCF causal factor, tier I
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Unsafe Acts

Unsafe Acts

Figure 12 HFACS CSCF causal factors distribution

The Unsafe Act (US) causal factors represent 19% of total causal factors and
together with the Precondition for Unsafe Act (PUA) represent 51.6% of total causal
factors. The Operator Violation represent 42.9% of the unsafe acts, while
representing 8.1% from total HFACS-CSCF causal factors, the operator violations
corresponding granular factors in the 4th tier show shippers’ mis declared or
undeclared dangerous goods, which through the analysis represent the most frequent
Unsafe Act (US) unleashing the container ships fire accident sequence.
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Unsafe Acts classification and percentage
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Figure 13 Unsafe Acts (US) 3rd tier distribution and percentage

The distribution of Errors to Violations in the Unsafe Acts (US) category trend to the
Errors with 53%, while Violation represents 47% from all Unsafe Acts.

Unsafe Acts Errors and Violations

Errors

47%

53%

Figure 14 Unsafe Acts Errors and Violations
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Violations

The precondition for unsafe act (PUA) with 84 causal factors represent 32.6% of all
causal factors in container ships fire accident occurrence, with Physical Environment
as the most frequent third tier causal factors forming 22.9% of all causal factors in
the HFACS CSCF and 70% of the (PUA) factors set. Technological Environment
come second with 18% from PUA factors set.

In the PUA tier three, physical environment, and corresponding tier four with
detailed factors, the difficult of accessibility to the source of fires and absence of
suitable ventilation inside the container, each form 4.7% of total HFACS CSCF
causal factors. They represent combined 9.4% of the total causal factors.

Precondition for Unsafe Acts 3rd tier
classification and percentage
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Figure 15 Precondition for Unsafe Acts (PUA) 3rd tier distribution and percentage

36

The unsafe supervision category contributes to 10.5% of total HFACS factors, with
shipborne and shore supervision factors on top with 20 occurrences represent 7.8%
of total HFACS CSCF causal factors.

Unsafe supervision 3rd tier classification and percentage
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Figure 16 Unsafe Supervision (US) 3rd tier distribution and percentage.

The contributing factor related to Organization Influence (OI) category have 44
occurrences with 17.1% of total HFACS CSCF factors. Factors related to Equipment
and Resources failure have majority percentage of this category, while representing
8.9% of total HFACS CSCF causal factors, the fourth-tier factors related to
equipment and resources occurrence is absence of alternatives firefighting system to
contain and supress the large-scale fires in cargo holds, which have seven
occurrences with 2.7% of total HFACS CSCF. The second frequent set within the OI
category is technological resources split between poor activation mechanism and
poor design for fixed firefighting systems mainly the carbon dioxide, five of each has
occurrence with 1.9% of total HFACS CSCF causal factors in the fourth tier.
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Organizational Influences 3rd tier
classification and percentage
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Figure 17 Organizational Influences 3rd tier distribution and percentage.

Regulator Factor (RF) as level one has 20.9% contribution to total causal factors,
with failures related to port state implementation of international regulations
regarding container inspection and content verification with focus on dangerous
goods containers. These have 20 occurrences with 7.8%, in addition to the absence of
legislation against false declaration of dangerous goods with three occurrences
representing 1.2% of total causal factors.

Regulatory Factors 3rd tier classification and
percentage
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Figure 18 Regulatory Factors 3rd tier distribution and percentage.
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4.3. Unpublished container fires investigation reports negative impact
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Figure 19 Container ships fire accidents per year- published and unpublished investigation reports

The feedback that the maritime industry and researchers get from casualties is the
investigation reports, reviewing such reports and identifying lessons and creating
mitigation measures to prevent reoccurrences. This is the only link to enhance the
safety in general and the fire safety measure in the maritime domain. In absence of
such link, reoccurrence of such disastrous fire accidents is probable. The number of
fire accidents with published investigation reports are representing 43% of total
container ship fire accidents, meaning that the causal factor revealed through HFACS
CSCF is the tip of an iceberg with undetected latent causal factors represented in all
these unpublished or unaccomplished investigations reports.
In the decade of 2010 -2020, the total container ship fire accidents peaked twice,
once in 2015 with eleven occurrences, while others were in 2019 with seven
occurrences.
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4.4. Activation occurrence of Fixed Firefighting Systems – Carbon
Dioxide and failure percentage
Among the 19 analyzed container ship cargo fires, the Carbon Dioxide as a Fixed
Gas System for cargo hold protection has been used 11 times. The system was
ineffective 10 times with failure percentage up to 91%. It is worth noting that in
those 10 times, the system had technical failure on 4 occasions, while CO2 was
released on the remaining 6 occasions. Without efficiency in fire suppression, the
failures were either due to human error or latent technical failure.
Fire in the container ship cargo area is deep seated fire, where solid material is
involved and subject to smouldering (NFPA, 2022), accompanied with high
temperature, dense smoke, and unexpected explosions.
The IMO mandate through SOLAS II-2/10.7.1.3 fixed a carbon dioxide gas system
to protect cargo space for ships above 2000 gross tonnage. The same requirements
apply through SOLAS II-2/10.7.2 for any cargo space authorized for dangerous
goods carriage, and such requirements are applicable for all container and cargo
ships (IMO, 2022c).
Carbon dioxide is used as a fixed gas system with smothering effect, which
suffocates the fire by replacing the oxygen, preventing the fire from one necessary
element to continue and escalate.
The Extinguishment Concentration for CO2 is set through many standards including
the NFPA-2001, measured by the cup burner method, and through such tests, the
Minimum Extinguishment Concentration (MEC) and Associated Minimum Designed
Concentration (MDC) are defined.
𝑀𝐷𝐶 = 𝑀𝐸𝐶 × 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
Where:
MDC: Minimum Design Concentration
MEC: Minimum Extinguishing Concentration
Safety factor: depend on type of protected item, material, or cargo
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Equation 1 Minimum Design Concentration calculation

The carbon dioxide MDC depend on the type of cargo in the cargo space, as example
for flammable gases and associated vapour the MDC vary and set in table 5.3.2.2 in
NFPA 12 standard related to carbon dioxide extinguishing system, and in any case
shall not be less than 34% from gross volume of protected space (NFPA, 2022).

Examining Resolution MSC.206(81), which entry into force at 2010 as fire safety
system (FSS) code amendments, the required CO2 gas concentration for cargo space
protection equal to 30 % of protected space gross volume, knowing that carbon
dioxide occupies 0.56 m3 for one kilogram (IMO, 2010b), hence the discharge
quantity of CO2 depends on the available volume of the cargo hold.
The NFPA 12 standard set in paragraph 5.3.5.3 that for each 2.8°C above 93°C, one
percent of gas concentration should be increased, such point needs to be considered,
moreover, when two materials have different MDC will be available in the protected
space, the higher MDC should be considered (NFPA, 2022), due to the nature of
container shipping industry and the variety of cargo inside the hold, not mentioned
the hazard of undeclared dangerous cargo inside the hold , the MDC for CO2 fixed
system need technical review in the awake of recent failure or un effectiveness of the
system after release.
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Carbon Dioxide Fixed Gas System Efficiency
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Figure 20 Carbon Dioxide Fixed Gas System Efficiency

The human error in starting procedure of fixed carbon dioxide system represented in
Unsafe Act level (UA2) with two occurrence form 0.8% of total HFACS CSCF
causal factors, the cases reveal such occurrence was Caroline Maersk in 2015 and
MSC Flaminia in 2012 (BSU, 2014), in Carolina Maersk case, due to unfamiliarity
with the system the control valve in the control station was not in fully opened
position led to explosion in the CO2 room itself (DMAIB, 2016).

Other failure occasions were due to latent technical failures which does not reveal
through the last inspection or audit, the technical failure on one occasion caused by
two leakage points at the system lines prevent the CO2 to be delivered to the intended
cargo space (MSIU, 2016), in the other occasion the time delay unit was not
functional resulted the failure of gas release through the system pipelines (BSU,
2020) and last case of latent design failure was in MSC Flaminia with misconnected
pipes and arrangement combined with the human error occur before the start of the
system (BSU, 2014).
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The CO2 system discharge lines condition and time delay unit functionality are
covered through IMO “Revised Guidelines for The Maintenance and Inspections of
Fixed Carbon Dioxide Fire-Extinguishing Systems”, “MSC.1/Circ.1318/Rev.1”, in
the “minimum required maintenance” at intermediate or renewal survey the system
piping shall be blown with dry air or nitrogen after disconnected from the main
system (IMO, 2021b), knowing that the intermediate survey can held within second
or third anniversary with six months “time window” (IMO, 2012).

Furthermore, the detailed inspection and testing checklist attached to circular 1318
with discharging line integrity and time delay unit functionality included , the fact
that vessels faced escalated fire situation due to such problems spot the light to the
credibility of such service and maintenance schedule and quality, in addition, the
integrity of carbon dioxide discharging lines under pressure can be checked by the
crewmembers in annual base to maintain the readiness state of such critical
firefighting system, with reported data back to the company and stakeholders.

4.5. Container fire casualties by flag state and severity for published
fire investigation report in 2010-2020 period
The IMO Casualty Investigation Code has a definition for “very serious casualties”
as “any marine casualty involving the total loss of the ship or life loss or severe
environmental damage” (IMO, 2008b), But, neither “serious” nor “less serious”
casualties have a standard definition in the code (IMO, 2008b).
The investigation authorities for member states have different criteria for severity
classification (Wang et al., 2021), to facilitate the reporting procedure to IMO the
casualties have been categorized into four categories, “very serious, serious, less
serious and marine incident” (IMO, 2008a), where “serious casualty” can be defined
as casualty not qualified as “very serious” accidents and involve fire, explosion or
grounding lead to main engine disabled and extensive structural damage and required
salvage or shore assistance (Wang et al., 2021), and accordingly the less serious
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casualties defined as accidents that does not qualified as “very serious” or “serious”
casualties (Wang et al., 2021).

Retrieving data from the 19 identified container ship fire accidents in cargo area in
2010 – 2020 period through the provided investigation reports by GISIS reveal
eleven serious, five less serious and three very serious container ship fire accidents,
it’s clear that most of container fire accidents in cargo area have a serious severity
(Figure 22), where external assistance were required, and ships suffer
accommodation and structure damage, while three very serious casualties lead to
total loss of the vessel or death cases or sever pollution , five less serious accident
with light impact.

Container ships cargo area fire
accidents severity in 2010 - 2020

16%

26%
Less Serious
Serious
Very serious

58%

Figure 21 Container ship cargo area fire accident severity in the period 2010-2020

All casualties’ cases connected to the Denmark was serious, all was investigated in
detail with excellent quality investigation report, while most of Maltese flag fire
accidents was less serious, Liberian flag casualties either serious or very serious
(Figure 23).
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Figure 22 Container fire accidents by flag states and severity in 2010- 2020 period

4.6. Average duration of container ships fires in the period 2010-2020
and sustainability of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus air
supply
Part of increasing our awareness about container ships fires is knowing its
characteristics, types, and behaviour in addition to spread mechanism.

The average duration for continuous fire on board container ships in the period 20102020 after reviewing the accidents narratives in the 19 published fire accident reports
is seven days or 168 hrs, such prolonged duration reflect the challenges faced either
by crew onboard (Table 7).
According to SOLAS II-2/10.10.1 all ships shall carry two firefighter outfit (IMO,
2022c), such outfit consist of personal set and self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA) with Two spare cylinders for each set (IMO, 2019), which mean a total four
spare cylinders to be available according to SOLAS, II-2/10.10.2.5 (IMO, 2022c).
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In addition, cargo vessels authorized to carry dangerous goods as the container ships
shall carry two SCBA with two spare cylinders for each set according to SOLAS, II2/19.3.6.2 (IMO, 2022c).

Table 5 Container ships fires durations and average 2010-2020

Fire accident date
28-09-20
23-02-20
11-11-19
03-01-19
06-03-18
12-02-17
01-09-16
15-06-16
21-02-16
20-11-15
07-09-15
26-08-15
01-05-15
06-04-14
15-07-13
18-06-13
20-07-12
14-07-12
07-07-10

Ships Name
X-PRESS GODAVARI
CROATIA
FILIA T
YANTIAN EXPRESS
MAERSK HONAM
APL AUSTRIA
CCNI ARAUCO
CMA CGM ROSSINI
LUDWIGSHAFEN EXPRESS
MSC KATRINA
BARZAN
CAROLINE MÆRSK
HANJIN GREEN EARTH
NOTHERN GUARD
HANSA BRANDENBERG
EUGEN MÆRSK
ZIM RIO GRANDE
MSC FLAMINIA
CHARLOTTE MAERSK
Average

Fire Duration in days
2
0
0.2
18
6
3
3
5
0.4
0.8
7
3.33
13
1
7
6
0.1
49
12
7 days

SOLAS convention considers the cylinders will be used during training and drills
and mandate in Regulation 15.2.2.6 either that spare cylinders should be available to
compensate the ones used in drills and training, taking into consideration the drills
frequency, or means should be available for cylinders refilling (IMO, 2022c).
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Summarizing SOLAS requirements for SCBA carriage and spare charges, the
container vessels have to carry four sets of SCBA with two options regard the spare
charges either eight spare cylinders and a number of additional spare cylinders to
compensate drills activities related, or four spare cylinders if the vessel equipped
with refilling means such Breathing Air Compressor (IMO, 2022c).
Considering that SCBA with air volume 1200L provide 30 minutes (IMO, 2019) and
other types with air volume 1800L provide 40 minutes of air supply (ABS, 2022a),
noting the aforementioned rules and first option ,which required 200% spare charges,
12 cylinders of air will be available in container ships in case of fire, knowing that
any firefighting team consist of at least two crew members, which mean, every crew
member of the team will have six cylinders, multiplying the cylinders number by 40
minutes per each, which is the maximum, leading to that time available with air
supply for each crew member will be 240 minutes or four hours, in a ship type with
average fire duration of a weak -seven days.
The sustainability of air supply to firefighting crew members onboard container ships
as a regulation need to be revised, reviewing the causal factors in HFACS CSCF
there have been four occurrence of air cylinder lack related to equipment and
resources under Organizational Influence (OI) category represent 1.6% of all causal
factors, with associated occurrence in regulatory factors (RF1) where current
regulatory framework failed to sustain air supply for SCBA and firefighting effort
accordingly.

Comparing with other ship type, in the scope of regulatory framework, the passenger
vessels carrying more than 36 passengers are mandated according to SOLAS II2/10.10.2.6 to carry either charging means for SCBA air cylinders or storage system
with high pressure for air supply of the SCBA.
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Figure 23 Container ships fires duration and average 2010-2020

Its worthy note that SOLAS give the maritime administration of any flag the right to
increase the number of SCBA or spare charges (IMO, 2022c) in relation to type and
size of the vessel according to SOLAS, II-2/10.10.2.4, furthermore, SOLAS
convention as international standard known to set the minimum requirement also,
meaning that flag state and RO can increase the numbers of SCBA, and spare
charges based on HAZID.
According to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) classification society, the rules
for building and classing marine vessels, the same SOLAS optional requirements
available regard to 200% spare charges for SCBA or 100 % spare charges if refilling
means is available (ABS, 2022b), without mandating the breathing air compressor,
meanwhile, the Enhanced Fire Protection notation for cargo area (EFP-C) issued by
ABS as additional notation, eligible for container vessels, require breathing air
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compressor with independent power supply and 75 ltr/min charging capacity and for
protection of open deck cargo area a total eight sets of SCBA to be available (ABS,
2022a).
In additional notations set by the DNV-GL classification society to enhance fire
safety measures in the scope of equipment and design features, which is eligible for
container carrier according to the notation, the breathing air compressor should be
available, with the same requirement provided by ABS regard power supply and
charging capacity (DNV GL, 2019).
Table 6 ABS and DNV-GL rules and notations related to Breathing Air compressor for SCBA refilling

CS

Rules/Notations

Part

ABS

Marine Vessels
Rules

4

ABS

Chapter Section Paragraph

7

3

15.5.1

Enhanced Fire
guide
Protection (EFP)

1

4

7.3

ABS

Enhanced Fire
guide
Protection (EFP)

4

2

7.3

DNVGL

Additional class
notations
, Equipment and
design features

5

4

1.7.4

6

Requirements
Same SOLAS II2/10.10
requirements for
SCBA spare
charges
Breathing air
compressor
8 set of SCBA for
open deck cargo
area
Breathing air
compressor

These additional notations provided either by ABS or DNV-GL are not mandatory
and act as additional requirements (DNV GL, 2019), exceeding the current standard
set by classification society itself and applicable IMO instrument with SOLAS
convention in the front.
Sustainability of air supply to refill SCBA cylinders mean sustainability in
firefighting effort by crew members until they supported by external assistance or
suppress the fire.
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4.7. Fire space of origin either on deck or at cargo hold
Most of the container ships fires in 2010 – 2020 period with published investigation
report originated in cargo hold, while 32% started on deck, the fire in cargo hold
associated with many challenges such difficult accessibility to the seat of fire and
impaired vision due to heavy smoke and unsuitability of fixed firefighting gas system
to the type of cargo on fire (Figure 25).

Fire Space of Origin

32%

fire start in cargo hold
fire start on deck
68%

Figure 24 Container ships fires space of origin

Due to ineffective fire containment measures, and absence of fire divisions to help
such principles, most of the cargo hold fires spread to the deck or vice versa,
transverse bulkheads between the holds shall be covered with drenching system to
help achieve such principle as a secondary option, with enhanced dewatering
capabilities to avoid accumulation of water accompanying the container ships cargo
hold fires.
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4.8. Sources of ignition in the published fire accidents on container
ships
Sources of ignition in container ships fires identified through the 19 investigation
reports, the calcium hypochlorite and charcoal came on the top of the list with 16 %
for each while lithium-ion batteries with undeclared unknown dangerous goods
sources came second with 11% for each, most of other sources of ignition have one
occurrence with 5 % from all sources (Table 9, Figure 26).

Table 7 Container ships fires sources of ignition

Sources of ignition

IMDG Class

N

%

9

2

11%

Charcoal

4.2

3

16%

Calcium hypochlorite

5.1

3

16%

Calcium chlorite- calcium chlorate

5.1

1

5%

Thiourea Dioxide-Formamidine Sulfonic Acid

4.2

1

5%

Divinylbenzene-Diphenylamine

4.1

1

5%

Methyl Ethyl Ketone Peroxide (MEKP)

5.2

1

5%

Sodium Dichloroisocyanurate Dihydrate
(SDID)

9

1

5%

Unknow-pyro char (coconut coal)

4.2

1

5%

Container collapse

n/a

1

5%

Cinnamon leaves

unclassified

1

5%

Cars spare parts/batteries/ flares /cigarette
lighter/ fuel tank

unclassified

1

5%

n/a

2

11%

-

19

Lithium-Ion Batteries

Undeclared dangerous goods- unknown
Total
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Figure 25 Container Ship Cargo Fires - Sources of Ignitions

4.8.1. Calcium Hypochlorite
The calcium hypochlorite has been identified as most frequent source of ignition in
many studies and research (Callesen et al., 2019), the CINS platform has issued
specific guidelines on the safe carriage of such material including limiting the weight
inside the container to 14 tonnes and authorize the carriage either in dry or reefer
container, the platform also specify that the control temperature for the reefer shall
be 10°C, while the dry container carriage required risk assessment taking into
account the temperature during the carriage (CINS, 2018), the CINS guidelines
demonstrate the eight variants of the material and confirm the IMDG special
provision no.314, which specify the hazard of thermal decomposition and carriage
requirement as “stowage in shaded area away from direct sun light and heat source”
(IMO, 2020a), but the undeclaration or misdeclaration of such hazardous material led
to stowage in unappropriated location and unleash the sequence of fire accident.
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The unsuitable stowage position for dangerous goods has been identified through
HFACS CSCF in the Precondition for Unsafe Acts (PUA 9), with 13 occurrences
represent 5% of all causal factors and most frequent factor in the PUA set, the
elevated temperature associated with tropical weather identified in PUA 7 with 10
occurrences, furthermore, absence of ventilation or direct sun light in PUA 6 with 12
occurrence, all these factors contribute to the thermal decomposition of such
materials and initiate fire or explosions accident, the CINS platform does not set a
carriage temperature for calcium hypochlorite in dry container nor the International
Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) code, furthermore, there is no specific
ventilation requirements (ex: passive, mechanical or nonmechanical5), nor
temperature monitoring for the dry container carriage.

4.8.2. Charcoal
The charcoal has three occurrences for investigated container cargo fires with
published investigation report in the 2010 – 2020 period, represent 11% of all
sources of ignition in these casualties, in addition the pyro char, which is coconut
coal used for shisha, has one occurrence on board MV Maersk Carolina (DMAIB,
2016).
Charcoal is identified as hazardous cargo due to self-igniting capabilities when
stacked in bulk and with high ambient temperature (Wolters et al., 2003), the
material classified as class 4.2 in the IMDG code with hazard identification as selfheated6 material only when in large quantity and stored for prolonged period (IMO,
2020b), the charcoal classified within class 4.2 after verified by specific test set in
the “Manual of Tests and Criteria, part III, 33.3.1.6” created by the UNECE7 (IMO,
2020b), with two variants, activated and non-activated charcoal (IMO, 2020b), the

5

ISO:6346

6

“Self-heating is the process by which materials achieve temperatures higher than

ambient because of internal exothermic reactions”(Wolters et al., 2003)
7

UNECE: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
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IMO Dangerous Goods Committee (DSC) publish circular number four in 1997,
included many dangerous goods accidents and among them the four fire accidents
occur at 1996 in Rotterdam port with non-activated charcoal cargo -UN number 1361
class 4.2- named as the source of ignition with unapproved packing (IMO, 2020b),
the DSC circular four was vital and attached to the IMDG code with other circulars
in the following years related to the dangerous goods fires.

The IMDG special provision SP 925 has been used as a gap in the IMO instrument
by shippers to avoid classifying the product as IMDG cargo with higher shipping
freight, the criteria set in “Manual of Tests and Criteria, part III, 33.4.3.3” in the
special provisions SP 925 cannot be checked or verified practically either in port or
by charter during any container inspection, and the volume of coal in the criteria may
vary from the real one shipped in the containers.
The recommendation provided by the BSU (2018) after the fire accident on board
MV Ludwigshafen Express was to prohibit stowage under deck for any cargo has
self-heating hazard even charcoal which is not declared as dangerous goods due to
SP 925 (BSU, 2018), with all relevant information about such hazard provided for
the crew and company.

4.8.3. Sodium Dichloroisocyanurate
Sodium Dichloroisocyanurate Dihydrate SDID is recognized as one of the ignition
sources in container ships fires (TSIB, 2020), the material classified under IMDG
class 9 but it had additional exothermic decomposition hazard revealed through the
fire investigation report for container vessels Maersk Honam (TSIB, 2020), the
IMDG code special provision SP135 exclude such material from class 5.1 for
oxidizing materials (IMO, 2020a) which contribute to absence of standardized cargo
risk factor information (RF4) about the material, such causal factor has been included
in HFACS CSCF level one of regulatory factors and have four occurrence with 1.6%
from all causal factors.
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Subsidiary risk of SDID exothermic decomposition and classification as 5.1 class
shall be considered in the next IMDG code amendments in the awake of the very
serious casualty of Maersk Honam (TSIB, 2020), It was not permitted to store such
material in the cargo hold if it was classified as 5.1 (TSIB, 2020), with absence of
alternative firefighting system to deal with large scale fire in organizational influence
OI6 factor, as carbon dioxide is un effective agent with oxidizing substances class
5.1 (IMO, 2020b), combined with Precondition for Unsafe Act PUA 6,7 for tropical
weather and absence of ventilation inside the container, and PUA 9 with unsuitable
stowage position for dangerous goods, leading to such severity.

4.8.4. Cinnamon leaves
Another source of ignition represents one occurrence but worth discussion as the
absence of standardized cargo risk factor information (RF4) about the material is
present, the Cinnamon leaves has been identified as a self-heating material through
the fire investigation report of MV FILIA T (MSIU, 2020), which need to be
considered through the IMDG code amendments, exploring the last version of the
IMDG code showing that the material is not included at all in the Dangerous Goods
List (DGL) of the code (IMO, 2020b).
Examining the risk factor from any recognized source led to the Transport
Information System (TIS), from the German Insurance Association (GDV e.V.), the
identified risk at TIS platform indicate that in absence of sufficient ventilation, a high
level of humidity may form inside the container with chemical transformation of
cinnamaldehyde, styrene may be formed when such humidity combined with
temperature above 19°C (TIS, 2022), the TIS set the safe transport temperature
within 15-19°C range, and the safe type of container as passive ventilated container
in addition to prohibition use of standard container due to the absence of suitable
ventilation (TIS, 2022).
The TIS set the storage condition onboard the ship as lowest temperature, away from
direct sunlight, neither at high layer on deck nor in cargo hold (TIS, 2022).
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The IMDG from other aspect has classified “Styrene” with all its synonymous such
phenylethylene, cinnamene and Styrene Monomer as class 3, flammable liquid with
united nation (UN) number 2055 (IMO, 2020b), neglecting the material that could
produce Styrene under humidity and tropical weather due to exothermic
decomposition (TIS, 2022) , which is cinnamon leaves, leaving such material without
any transport requirements or carriage temperature control same as the TIS have set,
leaving questions about the update and amendments mechanism for IMDG code
technical information and provisions.

4.9. Dangerous goods as the main factor contribute to container ships
cargo fires
95% from investigated container ships cargo fires caused by dangerous goods, with
11% from these dangerous goods are unclassified as dangerous goods, only 26%
from these dangerous goods were probably declared, while 32% were mis declared
and 37% undeclared at all, hazardous associated with undeclared dangerous goods
and unsuitable stowage position, environment and ambient temperature are high and
identified 15 years ago (IMO, 2007), the Risk Control Options RCO at that time was
ineffective (IMO, 2007), and the Risk Control Options RCO today for sure will be
more ineffective.
Table 8 Dangerous goods declaration status

Ships Name
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

X-PRESS GODAVARI
CROATIA
FILIA T
YANTIAN EXPRESS
MAERSK HONAM
APL AUSTRIA
CCNI ARAUCO
CMA CGM Rossini
Ludwigshafen
Express
10 MSC Katrina
11 BARZAN

Declared

Dangerous goods
mis declared
undeclared
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
56

12 CAROLINE MÆRSK
13 HANJIN GREEN
EARTH
14 NOTHERN GUARD
15 HANSA
BRANDENBERG
16 EUGEN MÆRSK
17 ZIM RIO GRANDE
18 MSC Flaminia
19 CHARLOTTE MAERSK
Total

x
x
x
x
n/a
x

n/a

n/a

x
x
5
26%

57

6
32%

7
37%

Chapter 5
Recommendations
5.1. Introduction
It will be more logical to summarize the challenges identified through HFACS CSCF
analysis, which the industry face before or during the container ships cargo fires,
then try to mitigate such challenges with available innovative technology to
minimize the cost and increase creditability, any recommendations will be based
upon finding and statistics from chapter three of this dissertation.
The digitalization can introduce low cost and innovative technology helping
overcome the challenges related to monitoring and control of temperature and
humidity inside the dangerous goods container as a first stage, then the hole
containerized cargo.
The same technology can be real time source of information for container content
and best extinguishment agent in case of fire.
The Internet of Things (IoT) concepts and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
applications and potentials will be explored as recommendations, considering the
cost and availability of such technology

5.2. Summary of container ships cargo fires challenges and
recommendations diagram
Through the 19 investigated container ships cargo fires many challenges have been
identified, part of the challenges related to SOLAS convention were classified with
the same sequence of chapter II-2 in SOLAS, prevention, detection, contain, supress
the fire and operational requirements (IMO, 2022c), furthermore, other challenges
related to other IMO instrument have been summarized (Table11), the
recommendations will be arranged in the same way (Figure 27).
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Table 9 Summarized challenges in container ship cargo fires

HFACS CSCF8
reference

Summarized Challenges
1.

Inability to fully detect undeclared or mis declared dangerous goods by shippers in the loading port.

2.

Absence of some hazardous material classification and associated risk information and safe carriage
requirements.
Delayed detection methods for fire or unsuitable detection methods or manual detection for cargo
on deck.
Absence of effective fire contain measures to achieve fire safety objective stated in SOLAS II2/2.1.1.4 related to control and contain the fire in the space of origin, with associated functional
requirements stated in SOLAS II-2/2.2.1.5.
Accumulation of seawater inside cargo holds due to high rate of extinguishment water than
dewatering rate (bilge pump capacity).
Ineffective or unsuitability of used fixed gas firefighting system.

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

Sustainability of Breathing Air (BA) for firefighting operation with SOLAS non-mandatory
requirement of BA compressor.
8. Absence of means of accessibility to seat of fires and high tier container fires and non-coverage
with foam applicator with fire hoses limited range.
9. Lack of crew knowledge regard container ships cargo fires characteristics led to delayed or
ineffective decisions or actions.
10. Coastal state refusal for providing port of refuge for container vessels in fire, either due pollution
impact fears and other responsibilities or lack of technical ability to provide assistance.
8

Refer to HFACS CSCF codes in Appendix A
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Regulatory Factor
and Unsafe Act
trend UA12-UA13

Classification
according to SOLAS
II-2

Prevention

RF3- RF4
RF1-UA1

Detection

RF1-PUA3

Contain

PUA14
Organizational
Factors trend OI2OI3-OI6

Suppression

OI8-PUA15
Precondition for
Unsafe Act trend
UA7-UA8-UA9

Operational Readiness
Other factors
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Figure 26 Recommendations for minimizing the container ships cargo fires

5.3. Prevention
5.3.1. Importance of humidity and temperature monitor and
control and the cost challenge
Temperature and humidity are vital elements for fires starting in dangerous goods
containers, the self-heating of charcoal induced by elevated ambient temperature
(BSU, 2018), while the higher the water content in the charcoal the more heat
absorption occur (BSU, 2018) leading to ignition.
Another hazardous material related is the Methyl Ethyl Ketone Peroxide (MEKP),
which involved in other container fire later in 2007 (DMAIB, 2010), it was
concluded that such material needs to be carried in reefer container, for controlled
temperature and humidity carriage, but such proposal never sees the light (DMAIB,
2010).
Humidity and temperature in the storage area can determine the stability of some
material such as Calcium Hypochlorite (DMAIB, 2010), setting on the top list of
container fires sources of ignition, furthermore, the cargo moisture content is very
important for its stability (DMAIB, 2010), calcium hypochlorite thermal
decomposition can occur due to heat generated from small quantity of water ingress
to the container (DMAIB, 2010).
Thiourea Dioxide9 thermal decomposition was the root cause of MV Zim Rio Grande
fire attributed to red sea high ambient temperature and humidity (MSIU, 2013).
Therefore, monitoring the humidity and temperature play vital role not only in fire
detection, but in fire prevention also, as the most suitable technique to manage any
fire, is to prevent its occurrence from the beginning as a proactive measure.

9

IMDG class 4.2 Substances liable to spontaneous combustion
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5.3.2. Temperature and humidity sensing as innovative packing
and monitoring technology
Callesen et al. (2019) presented some technologies to enhance the fire detection
principle in his paper for container ship fires risk, including temperature sensors and
Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC) among other options, the Passive Radio Frequency
Identification Device (RFID) tags commonly used for monitoring inventories and
managing logistics (Pradhan & Qiu, 2020), can be used innovatively for temperature
sensing (Pradhan & Qiu, 2020) inside the dangerous goods container as a first stage,
the cost is effective (Callesen et al., 2019), the chips can be afforded for less than 10$
per piece (Callesen et al., 2019), the passive RFID tags technology is more than
suitable for container atmospheric monitoring , the tags are easy to set and most
important battery free (Pradhan & Qiu, 2020).
Many technological temperature traceability solution has been raised such the “Orbis
traceability system”, using RFID subsystem combined with processing and
information subsystem (Urbano et al., 2020) depending on the Internet of Things
(IoT) principles and services, the common question about cost effectiveness or who
will pay is answered through Data as Service (DaaS) principle to avoid the high cost
of new implemented system, as the users will not pay for the installed apparatus but
only for the consumed data (Urbano et al., 2020), despite the fact that Urbano et al.
(2020) focus on the cold chain10 monitoring for food transport as example, but the
applications overseeds this scope.

The prevention principles start from the packing process till the final delivery of the
container, along this supply chain the container yard at the port is important as the
ship regard the stowage environment, the contradiction between dangerous goods
regulations for different transportation means (Rail-Road-Sea) with associated
manging risk (Gonzalez-Aregall et al., 2021), can be resit at this point.

10

“Low temperature control supply chain network”
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The dangerous goods container normally stored at dedicated containers yard, Ding et
al. (2016) set digitalized three layer system for container yard protection and
monitoring with three functions including monitoring of environmental parameters in
the yard or inside the containers, using the IoT as concept and RFID tags as
information source and link, with extra function including firefighting related
information as the most effective external agent to be used and the not preferred or
less effective agent to be avoided (Ding et al., 2016).
Ding et al. (2016) focus his scope inside the container yard, which is important, but
the applications can be widened to include the ship, neglecting the application cost as
the DaaS principle could apply also (Urbano et al., 2020).
The passive RFID antenna-based temperature sensing proposed by Pradhan & Qiu
(2020) can be utilized within ding scope, furthermore, the idea of using temperature
sensor inside each container can be widened to include humidity and carbon dioxide
monitoring inside the container (Ding et al., 2016).
Once a sensor applied in each container, a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) will be
formed, with monitoring centre unit (Ding et al., 2016), one of the feasible systems
which apply such concepts is the “Senor monitoring node”, which collect real time
data for temperature and humidity inside the container (Ding et al., 2016).

5.3.3. Dangerous goods containers and port held time risk
Entangled global supply chain result long held containerized dangerous cargo at the
port, with lack of accurate information regard long standing consequences (Lloyd’s
List, 2022), the total loss of MSC Flaminia attributed to dangerous goods container
stowed for 10 days in hot climate, with unknown impact for such stowage (Lloyd’s
List, 2022), another dangerous goods container held at the port for 60 days involved
in the disastrous fire accident of Xpress Pearl (Lloyd’s List, 2022).
The industry considers the port held time for dangerous cargo as a risk (Lloyd’s List,
2022), ports mitigation process for such risk varies, at Auckland port of New Zealand
the mitigation process for dangerous goods class 6 and 8 require limited storage time
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at ports for imports and exports (POAL, 2019), which does not exceed 72 hours
(POAL, 2019), to minimize the risk of these hazardous substances.
A safer container before loading means less chance of a fire accident onboard a
container ship.

5.3.4. The undeclared/mis declared dangerous goods containers
mitigation process
Through the HFAS CSCF analysis process, the shipper Unsafe Act of undeclare or
mis declare dangerous goods represent the most frequent factor in the unsafe act
level initiate the sequence of events led to a fire accident.
The statistics indicate that shipper compliance with requirements directly
proportional with the inspection chance for their container’s (NCB, 2020), inspection
authorities such United States Coast Guard (USCG) found it “unnecessary and
impossible” to inspect 100% of containerized cargo either imports or exports
(USCG, 2019), in lieu, the USCG set annual goal for numbers of containers to be
inspected (USCG, 2019).
“Container Inspection Safety Initiatives (CISI)”, launched by National Cargo Bureau
(NCB) in the aftermath of Maersk Honam fire, revealed that 57% of the inspected
dangerous

goods

container

failed

to

comply with

IMDG

requirements,

misdeclaration and failed documents represent 11% of the failure rate (NCB, 2022).
The dangerous goods transport cost reduction shall be considered as one of the
solutions, combined with limited administrative burdens to assist such scope
(Gonzalez-Aregall et al., 2021).
To summarize, the concentrated inspection program for either dangerous or nondangerous containers elevate the shipper’s compliance level with the regulations, and
the reduction of port held time reduce the associated risk with dangerous goods
containers.
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5.3.5. The dangerous goods container digital screening process,
development potentials and safety impact
A digital screening process can help mitigating the undeclared or mis declared
dangerous goods risk, novel methods depend on screen booking details itself to
detect “discrepancies” cargo documents (NCB, 2020) , new technology such
“Hazcheck detect” presented by “Exis technology” providing real time information
for non-compliant cargo using this concept (Existech, 2022).
The Exis can help detect the fraud by share detected cargo information to other
companies without revealing any information related to business competition
(Lloyd’s List, 2022), helping the marking of shipper’s unsafe act, the outcomes later
can be translated to blacklist for shippers with “fraudulent” behaviour to help
mitigating the undeclared or mis declared dangerous goods containers risk (Lloyd’s
List, 2022).

5.4. Operational readiness
5.4.1. The change of CO2 test procedure and mechanism to reveal
or expose any latent failure, the Risk-Based Inspection, and
guidelines.
The test procedure provided by MSC.1/Circ.1318/Rev.1 need to be amended,
considering the failure risks of the carbon dioxide system, with instruction for
blowing the system lines to the protected area with pressurized air every three
months by ship’s crew to maintain the preparedness state of such critical system and
detect any leakage, the current scheduled inspection and maintenance at
“intermediate, periodical or renewal survey”(IMO, 2021c) showing ineffectiveness
in revealing any latent failure, furthermore, means for checking the functionality of
time delay unit to be included as self-test in monthly bases which shall be directed to
the designers of the CO2 systems, also guidelines for simple operating instruction to
be followed by the designer and presented for the operators, to eliminate the
feedback deficiencies revealed by the container ship fire investigation reports.
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5.4.2. Crew awareness
Increasing crew awareness will help mitigate cargo fire risk and associated human
loss. The recommendation related to this scope is providing International Guidelines
for Container Ship Cargo Fires (See Appendix B); to enhance the awareness level by
providing information about cargo fire Characteristics of container ships. In addition,
the best-containing technique and good practices were identified through the HFACS
CSCF analysis will be presented.

5.5. Other regulatory factors
5.5.1. The mandate of publishing the fire accident investigation
reports as the only feedback from the industry to enhance the
fire safety level of container ship
No doubt that the mandate of casualty investigation in serious accidents will increase
the financial and administrative burdens on the casualty investigation boards,
however, it will reveal more deficiencies and more root causes of fires, increasing
our awareness and create more mitigation process or risk control options, assisting
the researchers and industry to mitigate the container ships cargo fire risks, such
scope need to be adopted for the sake of all stakeholders.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Coding Process for Fire Investigation Reports Of Container Ships
Name of the vessel:
1ST
TIER

2ND TIER

IMO No:

Regulatory Factors

Latent failure

Port state
implementation

n/a

TEU:

3RD TIER

International standard

Statutory

Start at:

CAUSAL FACTOR
The regulatory framework failed to cover the fire safety system requirements of the ship-in
relation to detection, containing, extinguishing or sustaining air supply for BA on board
container ships.
The approved testing procedure by IMO for fixed firefighting systems failed to identify latent
failure
Dangerous goods are not listed in the IMDG Code- IMDG code amendments required.
Absence of relevant standardized cargo risk factors information.
Failure to identify the content of the container in the loading port.
Failure to detect undeclared dangerous goods in the loading port.
Absence of protecting legislation against the mis declared of IMDG containers in the loading
port.
Existing flag and recognized organization regulations failed to provide capability for crew
detection, containing, extinguishing the fire

Ship Flag state/ RO
implementation

Failure to regulate the mandating of including all firefighting arrangements in the fire control
plan
Latent risk design - co2 system components
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CODE
RF1
RF2
RF3
RF4
RF5
RF6
RF7

RF8

RF9

RF10

Pag
e

Human resources
Technological resources

Organizational Influences

Resources
Equipment/facilities
resources

Organizati
onal
climate

Organizati
onal
process

OI1

Poor activation mechanism for critical fire safety systems
Poor fire safety systems design main fire line-co2 system
Failed to present emergency firefighting tools alternatives.
Provide the ship with low-quality/unsuitable firefighting equipment and tools.
Absence of alternative firefighting systems to deal with large-scale fires.

OI2
OI3
OI4
OI5
OI6

Absence of dedicated firefighting equipment to deal with small-scale fire

OI7

Insufficient firefighting equipment – lack of air cylinders – water lances – fire suits

OI8

Conflicting SMS firefighting procedures
Failed to provide relevant fire emergency procedure in ship Safety Management System SMS to
mitigate actual fire scenario
Failed to provide procedures for sustaining air supply for BA in case of emergency, 35 cylinders
Failed to supervise the maintenance process and test on board the ship for fire safety-critical
systems (fire pumps- fixed firefighting systems- emergency fire pumps-main fire line-drenching
system).
Failed to probably test fire safety-critical systems (co2-fire pumps-main fire line-hold sprinkler
system).
Failed to test the ship’s firefighting tools and equipment and check durability.
Failed to provide relevant training scenarios to mitigate the container fire risks.
Failed to obtain correct data about container content in loading port or from shipper side.
Failed to avoid known problem in sister vessel high stack weight
Unproper maintenance by crew main fire line leak
Ventilation flaps for the cargo hold left open without need for such action
Block stowage for dangerous goods under deck near the accommodation

OI9

Structure
Policies
Cultures
Operation
procedure

Oversight

Unsafe
Supervision/workplace
factors

Failed to provide relevant training to mitigate the container fire risks by the company

Inadequat
e
supervisio
n

Shipborne and shore
supervision(company)

Planned
inappropri

Shipborne operation
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OI10
OI11
OI12
US1
US2
US3
US4
US5
US6
US7
US8

ate
operations
Failed to
correct
known
problems
Supervisor
y violation

Planned unsafe repair/maintenance operation

Shipborne related
shortcomings

The ship fire control and safety plan did not show all firefighting arrangements (portable and
fixed)
Muster list did not detail designated crew duties clearly
Ship emergency response plan did not cover all firefighting primary actions

control
Access to ventilation was blocked preventing the close operation and disrupting the gas integrity
of the hold. By heavy dense white smoke

Precondition for Unsafe Acts

US10
US11
US12

Shipborne violation
Difficult accessibility/difficulty in reaching the seat of the fire or fixed extinguishing systems

Physical environment
Environme
ntal
factors

Technological
environment

Crew
condition

US9

Cognitive factors
Physiological state

The remoteness of the main fire line from containers in the holds.
Visual obstruction from the bridge to the fire location due to high stacked containers
Rough sea weather with associated winds- force 5 and up
Absence of adequate/suitable/sufficient ventilation inside the container
Elevated air temperature – tropical weather – with air temperature 18 c and above
Low temperature considers as a challenge in fighting the fire.
unsuitable DG Container Stowage position due to undeclared or mis declared DG by
shipper/charter- exposed to direct sunlight – or under the deck (in hold)-knowledge defect
Negative impact of the piracy countermeasures on the firefighting effort
Accumulation of seawater inside the hold/s hinders or slows down the extinguishing process
ineffective firefighting fixed systems or portable equipment used during critical firefighting
Fixed firefighting system technical failure at any component
Hold bilge system failure bilge suction valve actuator failure
Breathing apparatus air compressor failure
Fire pump or emergency fire pump failure
Range limitation of seawater from nozzles
Insufficient risk factors information
Crew fatigue due to extended firefighting effort more than 6 hour –15 HR
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PUA1

PUA2
PUA3
PUA4
PUA5
PUA6
PUA7
PUA8
PUA9
PUA10
PUA11
PUA 12
PUA13
PUA 14
PUA 15
PUA 16
PUA17
PUA18
PUA19

Personal
factors

Crew interaction
Personal readiness

Skill Based Error

Decision and judgment
error

Unsafe Act

Active failure

Errors

Perceptual errors

Violations

Operators’ error
Ship’s crew Routine
violation
Ship’s crew Exceptional
violation
Operator’s violation

Miss understands firefighting arrangement function or procedure

PUA20

Failure to early detect the fire
Failure to probably use the firefighting equipment / activate fixed firefighting system
Failure to evaluate or estimate the casualty consequences
Misunderstand fire safety procedure
Unsuitable firefighting equipment use.
Leave critical firefighting equipment in hazardous areas with limited access.
A wrong decision from leadership during firefighting procedure
Failure to take a critical decision in time –
Wrong assumption from the crew during situation assessment delayed reducing the ship
speed /or/CO2 RELEASE ASSUMPTION

UA1
UA2
UA3
UA4
UA5
UA6
UA7
UA8

Training drills on board the vessel did not simulate real emergency situations / no feed back to
the company about such violation

UA11

Shipping of Mis declared or undeclared dangerous goods -by shipper or charterer
Provide inconsistence cargo documents by shipper or charterer

UA12
UA13
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UA9

Appendix B
International Guidelines for Container Ship Cargo Fires


Characteristics of the container ship cargo fires



Rapidly developing fires- Charlotte Maersk.



Unexpected explosion- MSC Flaminia/ Charlotte Maersk.



Extended fire period, average time for the fires is seven days, led to resource
limitations and exhausted crew.



Deep seated fire with smouldering effect for solid materials.



Unknown cargo properties or undeclared IMDG goods involved.



Accessibility difficulties to the fire origin container or fire seat.



Lack of crew knowledge about the type of fire they are facing.



Summarized Challenges during firefighting in container ships from 19
accidents fire reports in the period 2010 to 2020:



Accumulation of water in holds and bilge system failure with stability issues
Yantin Express.



Contain the fire is not effective due to lack of containment arrangement and
systems or fire divisions in large scale fires.



Absence of accurate information about containers content and undeclared or
mis declared dangerous goods.



Refusal from coastal state to provide port of refuges to the vessels in fire due
to pollution fears and related responsibility or lack of technical ability to
assist.



Limited resources to fight extended fires, lack of air supply for Breathing
Apparatus, absence of breathing air compressor to refill the BA cylinders.



The detection of the fires at any deck cargo depending on the crew vigilance
and alertness – all fires on deck cargo detected by crew from bridge.
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Failure of coastal state technique to assist, such using the Aeroplan to fight
the containers fire by dropping waters - three attempts on charlotte Maersk
led to no effect in firefighting,2010



Good practices identified through the 19 fire accidents reports



Turn the ship off the wind – to keep the smoke away from the bridge,
accommodation ventilation and exposed muster station



Approach the fire from windward side to minimize the exposure of the crew
to the smoke

/ charlotte Maersk



Reduce the speed of the ship



Maintain good and effective shipboard organization to manage the
firefighting efforts



Adjust the watch keeping schedule and working hours to adapt with the
emergency



Eugen Maersk /charlotte Maersk

The early activation of CO2 system has pros and cons
Pros is containing any fire will arise in the hold in early stage with benefits
associated such saving resources and effort of crew to contain afire in cargo
hold (Charlotte Maersk) and the cons that CO2 system is one bullet gun, once
you shoot it there is no alternative method to deal with large scale fire in
cargo hold (Yantin Express/Barzan).



Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC) and laser thermometer showing great benefit
monitoring the flow path of the fire inside containers / MSC KatrinaCMA CGM Rossini p.20



Drills on board container ship shall simulate the real emergency – and
training include using drilling machine shall be part of it – also to test the
driller durability among other equipment’s.

82

